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ENTRAPMENT IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
I
INTRODUCTION
Entrapment is "the conception and planning of an offense by an officer and
the procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpet-
uated it except for the trickery, persuasion, or fraud of the officer." 1 The
federal courts first recognized the doctrine in Woo Wai v. United States, in
1915, but not until 1932 did the Supreme Court recognize this defense.
In Sorrells v. United States,3 the Supreme Court held that a defendant who
had been entrapped into the illegal sale of liquor by a prohibition agent
could not be convicted.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the procedure used in
determining whether entrapment is present in a given factual situation.
The federal courts uniformly hold the question of entrapment to be
within the province of the jury. Only if the evidence is convincing enough
to establish the presence or absence of entrapment as a matter of law will
the court decide the issue. If the evidence is not so strong, the issue will
be submitted to the jury for its consideration in reaching a general verdict
of guilt or innocence.' The jury makes no separate decision on this issue.
It will first be submitted that under the present test entrapment is
properly a question for the court's determination, rather than that of the
jury. Secondly, that the present test of entrapment, in looking to the
intent of the parties, should be abandoned in favor of a standard which
looks towards the reasonableness of the conduct of the police; again, a
question properly to be determined by the court.
II
PRESENT TESTS "ORIGIN OF INTENT"
The leading Supreme Court cases are Sorrells and Sherman v. United
States.3 In both cases, the court unanimously found entrapment estab-
122 C.J.S., Crim. Law §45(2), at 138.
2 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
3 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
4 Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Rodriguez v. United States, 227
F.2d 912 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955) ; United
States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1954) ; Lufty v. United States, 198 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1952) ; Nero v. United States, 189 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1951) ; Ryles v. United States, 183
F.2d 944 (10th Cir. 1950) ; Cratty v. United States, 163 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1947) ; United
States v. Brandenburg, 162 F.2d 980 (3rd Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Cerone, 150 F.2d 382
(7th Cir. 1945); United States v. Lindenfield, 142 F.2d 829 (2nd Cir. 1944); Hung v. United
States, 111 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1933);
Cermak v. United States, 4 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1925); Newman v. United States, 299 Fed. 128
(4th Cir. 1925); Butts v. United States, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921); Peterson v. United
States, 255 Fed. 433 (9th Cir. 1919).
5 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
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lished as a matter of law, thereby reversing the lower courts' decisions and
ordering dismissal of the indictments. Though unanimously holding en-
trapment established, the court was divided as to the test to be applied
and the procedure to be followed. The Sorrells majority formulated the"origin of intent" test to be applied by the jury, which was later followed
by the majority in Sherman. From this theory, Justices Roberts, Brandeis,
and Stone dissented in Sorrells, while Justices Frankfurter, Douglas,
Harlan and Brennan dissented in Sherman. The dissenters proposed a
test looking towards the "police conduct" to be examined by the court,
rather than the jury.
The "origin of intent" theory is essentially as follows:
It is well settled that the fact that officers or employees of the Govern-ment merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the
offense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may beemployed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises.... A different
question is presented when the criminal design originates with the
officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its
commission in order that they may prosecute.6
The controlling question is:
• . . whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the
Government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is theproduct of the creative activity of its own officials. 7
The federal courts uniformly follow this test and hold it within the
province of the jury to determine whether the intent to commit the alleged
offense originated with the defendant or with the Government official.
If the jury finds the intent originated with the Government officials and
the defendant was not predisposed to commit the crime, the defendant
must be acquitted. If, however, it finds the defendant already had the
requisite intent or predisposition, the mere fact that he was apprehended
through the "artifice or stratagem" of a Government official is of no
effect. Two steps are thus involved:
On the one hand, at trial the accused may examine the conduct of the
Government agent; and on the other hand, the accused will be subjectedto an "appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct andpredisposition" (citing Sorrells) as bearing on his claim of innocence."
With such a test, the jury, in effect, balances the equities between the
Government and the defendant, i.e., is more guilt attributable to the
Government or to defendant?'
6 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-442 (1932).
7 Id. at 45 1.
8 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958). Note the similarity of the language
in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932):
The Government in such a case is in no position to object to evidence of the activities of its repre-sentatives in relation to the accused, and if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment hecannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition' asbearing upon that issue.9 It must be here pointed out that in deciding Sherman the majority refused to re-examine
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To determine a more preferable procedure for deciding the issue of
entrapment, one must examine the difficulties with this "origin of intent"
test. Two conclusions may be reached: (1) If such a test is to be applied,
it is a matter for the court, rather than the jury to consider; (2) The test,
however, should be abandoned in favor of that asserted by the dissenters
in Sorrells and Sherman.
III
DIFFICULTIES WITH "ORIGIN OF INTENT"
Once the entrapment issue is interposed, the predisposition and criminal
design of the defendant come in issue. The Government may then, in re-
buttal, introduce evidence to show reasonable grounds for the agent's
activity. In this rebuttal the record and reputation of the defendant be-
come important. ° This is not a question of impeaching the defendant's
testimony, rather of establishing his predisposition and intent. The state
of mind of the defendant is weighed against the activities of the Govern-
ment. The following facts have been allowed as rebuttal in the federal
courts: Prior federal convictions;" prior misdemeanor convictions in a
felony prosecution; 12 prior state convictions in a federal prosecution;"
knowledge of prior activities for which never charged; 14 statements of
other addicts;15 mere possession of narcotics;"' and, a ready response. 7
If the jury finds this evidence indicates a continuous course of conduct
amounting to a predisposition of the defendant to commit the alleged
crime, then the Government is held justified in evoking the particular
offense.'
Under the majority theory, this evidence, though highly prejudicial,
is for the consideration of the jury in rendering a general verdict of guilt
or innocence. Such evidence would be inadmissible hearsay in the trial of
the doctrine according to the dissenting opinion in Sorrells. They did so because the parties
had not raised the issue below and "we do not ordinarily decide issues not presented by the
parties. .. ." Justice Frankfurter in Sherman then indicates that there is not such a "rigid rule"
of restricting argument, rather the court should have set the case down for re-argument to
re-examine the rule.
10 Ryles v. United States, 183 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1950).
11 Demos v. United States, 205 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953).
12 Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952).
13 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2nd Cir. 1933).
14 United States v. Johnson, 208 F.2d 404 (2nd Cir. 1953) ; Heath v. United States, 169
F.2d 1007 (10th Cir. 1948) ; Billingsley v. United States, 274 Fed. 86 (6th Cir. 1921).
15 Strader v. United States, 72 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1934) ; United States v. Siegel, 16
F.2d 134 (D.C.D. Minnesota 1926).
16 United States v. Pappagoda, 288 Fed. 214 (D.C.D. Conn. 1923).
IT United States v. Sawyer, 210 F.2d 169 (3rd Cir. 1954).
18 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
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the guilt of the accused. It is admissible, however, in an attempt to justify
the activities of the Government.1" The dissenters in Sherman recognize
that the danger of prejudice is great when evidence of the defendant's
reputation, criminal activities, and prior disposition is admitted. This is
particularly felt to be so when both the question of entrapment and that
of commission of the offense are submitted to the jury to be determined
by a general verdict of guilt or innocence.2"
In considering this problem, one must examine the recent majority
opinion of Mr. Justice White in Jackson v. Denno21 where the Supreme
Court discussed the difficulties in submitting the issue of voluntariness of a
confession to the jury and allowing it to reach a general verdict of guilt or
innocence. The Supreme Court struck down such a procedure on the
rationale that the jury might distort the issues involved. The possible
truth of the confession was feared to infect the jury's finding as to its
voluntariness and the guilt of the defendant. A belief in the truth of the
confession might cause the jury to find it voluntary, when in fact it was
involuntary-i.e., ". . . matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will
infect the jury's finding of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as its
conclusion upon that issue itself .... , 22 Even though the jury may have
found the confession involuntary and rejected it, ". . . the fact of a defend-
ant's confession is solidly implanted in the jury's mind ...,". and will
influence any verdict it may reach. This distortion and inability to separate
the issues of guilt and voluntariness led the Court to strike down the jury's
determination of voluntariness.
In entrapment, we see that evidence inadmissible on the question of
guilt is submitted to the jury on the question of entrapment. The danger
here is twofold. Not only may the jury be prejudiced by the evidence
admissible in rebuttal, but it may well confuse the issues of the defend-
ant's commission of the act with that of his entrapment. The fact that
the defendant committed the act may infect the jury's findings on the
question of whether he was entrapped into its commission. In following
the rationale of Jackson v. Denno, the question of "origin of intent" is
properly a matter for the court's determination. A finding on the question
of entrapment, independent from that on the guilt of the defendant, is
within the province of the court.
Further difficulties, however, are encountered with this "origin of
intent" test which should lead to its abandonment. This theory makes the
19 "This evidence was not afforded for the purpose of establishing the guilt of appellant.
For that purpose it would be hearsay and therefore incompetent. It was offered for the
purpose of justifying the entrapment of appellant . . ." Heath v. United States, 169 F.2d
1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948).
20 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958).
21378 U.S. 368 (1964).
22 Id. at 383.
2 Id. at 389.
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controlling factor the predisposition of the defendant. The rationale justi-
fying the admission of rebuttal evidence is that since the defendant was
the one who interjected the issue of entrapment, he cannot complain of
an inquiry into his own conduct.24 If the defendant elects to avail himself
of the defense, he must allow the prejudicial evidence to be admitted
against him. The objection here is that it is unfair to prejudice a defendant
for availing himself of a valid defense.
Admission of evidence on predisposition tends to divert the issue
from the guilt of the defendant for the particular offense to that of the
nature of his prior conduct. A defendant has a right to be tried on the par-
ticular offense charged.25 In almost every instance where the defense of
entrapment is interposed, however, the intent that this particular offense
be committed at this particular time originated with the Government
agent.2 6
The danger is that the individual's prior conduct will determine his
conviction or acquittal in this particular case. One defendant may be
convicted because his prior record and reputation were found to justify
the police conduct, while another defendant may be acquitted because his
lack of such prior conduct caused the same activity to be entrapment. 7
Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognizes this possibility, saying that:
Permissible police activity does not vary according to this particular
defendant concerned; surely if two suspects have been solicited at the
same time in the same manner, one should not go to jail simply because
he has been convicted before and is said to have a criminal disposition.2 8
The danger inherent is "to say that such conduct by an official of Govern-
ment is condoned and rendered innocuous by the fact that the defendant
had a bad reputation or had previously transgressed."29 The tendency to
make the prior activities of the defenda'nt controlling on the question of
his guilt in this particular case, is even more apparent when the matter
is submitted to the jury.
24Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932); accord, Heath v. United States,
169 F.2d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1948); United States v. Siegel, 16 F.2d 134 (D.C.D. Minn.
1926).
25 United States v. Washington, 20 F.2d 160 (D. Neb. 1927).
26 See Mikell, Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 90 U.Pa.L.Rev. 245 (1942),
criticizing that the particular offense is almost always planned by the officer so that under a
literal interpretation there could never be a conviction. Thus, the court seems to have in
mind not that he could not have committed the particular crime for which he is on trial, but
that it did not appear that he had previously been engaged in committing crimes of similar
character.
Of course in every case of this kind the intention that the particular crime be committed originates
with the police, and without their inducement the crime would not have occurred. Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
27 The fact that the accused had previously engaged in a sirmilar course of conduct may
be held to justify the police testing the defendant. Mikell, supra note 26.
28 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
29 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932).
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In focusing on the origin of intent rather than the causal activities of
the Government, the anomalous situation has been reached that a prin-
cipal defendant may be acquitted because he was entrapped, while those
accomplices he brought into the crime cannot claim the defense. The
intent that the accomplices commit the crime originated in their own
minds, rather than with the Government agents.8" Although the acts of
the agents were sufficient to constitute entrapment as to the principal,
and even though only through the principal's activities did the accomplices
enter the crime, the fact that the latters' intent to commit the crime did
not originate with the Government agent deprives them of the defense2
In spite of the prevailing Sorrells view, some courts have held it
incongruous to acquit the principal and convict the accomplice. 2 The
entrapment of the principal is held the productive cause in the induce-
ment of the co-defendant. Following an agency rationale, some courts
find the police working through an unsuspecting third party to induce a
particular defendant to commit the offense, thus finding entrapment. 88
IV
BASIS USED
It next becomes necessary to examine the basis used by the courts in
justifying the acquittal of an entrapped defendant. Prior to Sorrells, the
Supreme Court had held that when the accused violated the letter of the
statute, the fact that the violation was instigated by Government agents
in no way detracted from his guilt. "4 In both Sorrells and Sherman the
accused clearly violated the letter of the statutes involved. Yet the Su-
preme Court refused to make a literal interpretation of the statute. Rather
than finding it against the public policy to enforce the statute against the
accused, or that the Government is estopped by the conduct of its agents,
the court found the cases to be outside the purview of the statutes! '
We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in
enacting this statute that its processes of detection and enforcement
should be abused by the instigation by government officials of an act onthe part of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its com-
mission and to punish them. We are not forced by the letter to do vio-
lence to the spirit and purpose of the statute .... The case lies outside
30 Crisp v. United States, 262 F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958); United States v. Perkins,. 190
F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951).
31 Note, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333 (1960).
32 United States v. Klosterman, 248 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1957).
33 Johnson v. United States, 317 F.2d 127 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (dissenting opinion) ; United
States v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927) ; Note, 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1333 (1960).
34 Price v. United States, 165 U.S. 311 (1897); Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604
(1895).
35 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932) ; accord, Demos v. United States, 205
F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1953).
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the purview of the Act and . . . its general words should not be con-
strued to demand a proceeding at once inconsistent with that policy and
abhorrent to the sense of justice.8 6
Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced
by tempting innocent persons into violations.8 7
Though limiting themselves to the statutes involved, the majorities found
it unjust to hold the defendant's conduct within the scope of the Act.
They seemed to confuse the issue of the guilt of the accused with the
question of his entrapment. "The defense is available, not in the view that
the accused though guilty may go free, but that the Government cannot
be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the Government
officials are the instigators of his conduct." 8
The minority opinions in both Sorrells and Sherman object to such
interpretation. Recognizing that the defendant has clearly violated the
statute, they refuse to attribute any merit to his activities. Acquittal is
to be based on grounds of public policy rather than any construction of
congressional intent.3 9 The only congressional intent that can be found is
to make criminal exactly that conduct in which the defendant has en-
gaged. In relieving him of the punitive consequences of his act, the court
should not attribute innocence to his activities. He is to be acquitted not
because his conduct falls outside the limits of the statute, but because
"even if his guilt be admitted, the methods employed on behalf of the
Government to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced. '40 A
different basis should thus be used for relieving the defendant from the
consequences of his act than that of attributing merit to his activities by
holding them outside of the statute.
Some courts have held that although the defendant has committed
the act, the Government is estopped to prosecute.41 This basis, however,
seems to be answered effectively by the Sorrells majority in saying that
the statutes are designed to redress a public wrong rather than a private
injury and there is no reason to estop the prosecution because of the
conduct of the Government officers.4 2
Realizing that the interpretations of Sorrells and Sherman were con-
fined to the statutes involved, the majority of cases have relieved the
defendant of responsibility as a matter of public policy.43 No attempt
3 6 Sorrells v. United States, supra note 35, 448-449.
37 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
38 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932) (Justice Roberts, concurring).
39 Id. at 456.
40 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
41 United States v. Kaiser, 138 F.2d 219 (7th Cir. 1944) ; United States v. Lynch, 256
Fed. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Voves v. United States, 249 Fed. 191 (7th Cir. 1918).
42 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 445 (1932).
43 Woo Wai v. United States, 223 Fed. 412 (9th Cir. 1915) ; Butts v. United States, 273
Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921) ; United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933) ; United States
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is made towards a judicial interpretation of the statute, nor is there
any attempt to claim estoppel of the Government. The decision arises
from a "spontaneous moral revulsion"44 and public policy forbidding
that "officers sworn to enforce laws should seek to have them violated."45
The rationale is that public policy cannot condone such actions of law
enforcement officials.
V
PREFERABLE TEST: "POLICE CONDUCT"
In carrying out such a "public policy" argument, a different test than that
of "origin of intent" should be established. The minority in Sherman take
the preferable view. The controlling factor should not be whether the
defendant might have been subjectively predisposed to commit the par-
ticular crime, rather it should be the objective fairness of the police
conduct. "The crucial question . . . to which the court must direct itself
is whether the police conduct revealed in the particular case falls below
standards, to which common feelings respond, for the proper use of gov-
ernmental power."4 Such a "police conduct" theory attributes no merit
to a guilty defendant, but is founded in the public policy "which protects
the purity of government and its processes.""
It should be emphasized that in relieving the defendant of the conse-
quences of his act, the finding of entrapment does not make the de-
fendant any less guilty, and in no way proclaims he is innocent.48 The
v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D.Pa. 1927); Ritter v. United States, 293 Fed. 187 (9th Cir.
1923) ; United States v. Echols, 253 Fed. 862 (S.D. Texas 1918).
44 United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933).
45 Ritter v. United States, 293 F.2d 187, 189 (9th Cir. 1923).
46 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring).
47 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Justice Roberts, concurring).
48 "If he is to be relieved from the usual punitive consequences, it is on no account be-
cause he is innocent of the offense described." Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 380
(1958) (Justice Frankfurter, concurring).
Note should here be made that the majority of cases hold that a defendant may not
plead entrapment as a defense and at the same time deny the offense charged through a plea
of not guilty. The rationale is that the defense of entrapment necessarily presumes the act
was done; thus, any denial of the act is inconsistent with the entrapment claim. Inferentially
we may say these cases realize that the defendant is guilty of commission of the offense and
whether, in fact, entrapment is present is a different question.
See Sylvia v. United States, 312 F.2d 145 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Ramirez v. United States, 294
F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. DiDonna, 276 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1960); Ware v.
United States, 259 F.2d 442 (8th Cir. 1958) ; Rodriguez v.United States, 227 F.2d 912 (5th Cir.
1955) ; Hamilton v. United States, 221 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1955) ; Eastman v. United States,
212 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Pagano, 207 F.2d 884 (2d Cir. 1953). It is
interesting to note, however, some indication that such inconsistent defenses will be allowed, as
is the general practice in criminal as well as civil procedure. See Crisp v. United States, 262
F.2d 68 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Hansford v. United States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Matthews
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defendant did engage in criminal activity. The question of entrapment
must be kept separate from that of objective guilt. The focus should be
on the activities of the Government agents. "A test that looks to the
character and predisposition of a defendant rather than the conduct of
the police loses sight of the underlying reason for the defense of entrap-
ment."49
Such a test is not uncommon. In the area of search and seizure and
that of coerced confession, the focus is on the activities of the Govern-
ment agents rather than the objective guilt of the particular defendant.
One major consideration, when excluding coerced confessions, is the
" 'deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law'."50 Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissenting in Olmstead v.
United States," assert that the Government must not play such an
"ignoble part" as to foster crimes. Analogous to the equitable doctrine of"clean hands," the aid of the law is to be denied despite the defendant's
wrong in order to maintain respect for the law.52 Although no contention
is here made of a constitutional right involved in an entrapment,53 the
focus of the court should be the same. It should look to the activities of
the Government agents, rather than the guilt of the particular defendant.
The question should not be whether the intent that this particular
act be committed originated with the police or the accused, rather it
should be whether the police conduct would under normal circumstances
induce a reasonable man to commit the offense. There must be an ob-
jective examination of police activities to see that they would entrap"only those ready and willing to commit crime. 5 4 Such a standard would
not hamper the police from detecting those engaged in a continuous
course of criminal conduct.
This examination can consistently be applied by the court. In McNabb
v. United States,5 the Supreme Court defined the power and the duty of
v. United States, 290 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Henderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 169 (5th
Cir. 1956) ; Scriber v. United States 4 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1925) ; People v. West, 139 Cal.App.
2d 923, 293 P.2d 166 (1956). See also, 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law, §54 (1961); 28 U.S.C.A. 8(e).
4 9 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter concurring).
Compare: Raby v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 438 (1959), where the Supreme Court found that
regardless of bow the defendants should have behaved without the Government conduct,
they cannot be punished for something the Government led them to do.
50 Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 386 (1964) (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
320 [1959]).
51277 U.S. 438 (1927).
52 Id. at 470-483.
53 Hall v. Illinois, 329 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1964); Banks v. United States, 258 F.2d 318
(9th Cir. 1958). Contra, Comment, 74 Yale L.J. 942 (1965); Comment, 4 U.Pa.L.R. 821
(1964).
54 Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958).
55 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
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Federal Courts, regardless of any constitutional right involved, to estab-
lish and maintain sophisticated standards of procedure. This Federal
supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice should be
applied in the case of entrapment. In McNabb, the focus of the court was
on the activities of the police rather than the guilt of the particular de-
fendant. The same should be true in entrapment.
If this were a matter of the objective guilt of the defendant, the issue
would properly belong to the jury. However, since it is a matter of develop-
ing standards of reasonableness in police conduct, it should be within the
province of the court. Justice Roberts in Sorrells, followed by the minority
in Sherman, convincingly argued that
The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the purity of
its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the province of the court
and of the court alone to protect itself and the government from such
prostitution of the criminal law. The violation of the principles of justice
by the entrapment of the unwary into crime should be dealt with by the
court no matter by whom or at what state of the proceedings the facts
are brought to its attention.50
In Sherman, Justice Frankfurter further noted that the general verdict
of guilt or innocence given by the jury does not provide any guidelines
for future conduct. 7 Only the court through a gradual development of
explicit standards can establish guidelines for permissible police conduct.
VI
CONCLUSIONS
Two possible conclusions may thus be reached. If the "origin of intent"
test is to be retained, it should be a matter for the court's determination,
rather than the jury. Prejudice of the jury through admission of pre-
disposition evidence will thus be avoided.
The preferable approach, however, would seem to be an abandonment
of the "origin of intent" test in favor of one examining the "police con-
duct." The distinction will then be more apparent between the question
of the entrapment of the defendant and his commission of the offense
charged. The danger of finding the defendant not entrapped simply
because of his guilt in the commission of the offense will be alleviated.
In so looking towards the causal activities of the police, the incon-
sistent situation of the principal being acquitted while his accomplice is
convicted need not result. Since the test is basically one of "but for the
police conduct would a reasonable man have committed the offense," the
5 6 Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (Justice Roberts, concurring).
57 Recall that in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), the Supreme Court struck
down the procedure of sending the issue of voluntariness of a confession to the jury to be
considered in its general verdict of guilt or innocence. One reason for the Court's action was
that such a general verdict prevented the development of explicit standards of voluntariness.
[VoI. I
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co-defendant will not be denied the defense simply because his intent did
not originate with the Government agents.
Other factors may be examined by the court in determining the
reasonableness of the police conduct. The nature of the crime must be
considered. More police instigation would seem reasonable in those crimes
which are basically secretive than in those often done in the open. Per-
haps a distinction should be drawn between "one-party" and "two-party"
crimes. The typical "two-party" crime is that of a buyer-seller relation-
ship, e.g., sale of narcotics, where the court may find that the Govern-
ment is merely availing the defendant of an opportunity to continue a
course of criminal conduct. The "one-party" crime, however, where a
willing defendant could have committed the crime without any help
from another, would require very little Government enticement in order
to establish a valid claim of entrapment.
Michael Senneff
